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Introduction 
This contribution is the s'econd part of a discussion of the 
e~nstitutiona.Iity of the transitional, measures. in the Mineral and 
Ptetroleum Resources DevelQpmr~t Act 28 of 2002 (MPRD Act) in as 
far as they influence the basis of. mineral right holding ~d control jn 
South Africa. Part one set out tie categories of nghts acknowledged by 
the transitional provisions, the ~iu:re and content of "old order" rights 
vdth regard to mineralsl as compared to rights of the new order, and the 
requirements for transition of "olq order" rights to "new order" rigb.ts~ A 
numl, "ber of parti~ly: pro1?lema~c scenarios concJ~ded th~t di~cussion. ,As has been mdicated m the fll'St part of this contrtbUtion,2 the 
tra;risitioruU measures of the MPl,tl) Act nee4 to be scrutinised on the 
bfiSis of the constitational prop~ clause, because of the far-reaching 
e(fects the Act's policies of economic empowerment and state' custodian-
ship of natural resources may have Om. existing entit].emcnts with regard to 
niinerals. Part two now focuses on" the constitutionality of the transitional 
,-
• We would like to thank Prof Andri: van, del' Walt and Prof Iuanita Pienaa.r for reading and 
qomm.eating upon an earlier drafi. 'I'1Ie remaining errors are ours. Thank you also to Wharrcn Fortuin 
~ EbRIZia Jobnson for rendering rCseareb. assistance. The financial assistaDce' of the National 
Research: FOUJIdation is" gmtefuJly aclmowledged. OpWions expressed mould not be attributed to this 
mstitatien. " 
I ~ghti regarding petroleum. tKplomtion and ptJSdllCtion will :not be dhIeussed. 
2!fublished in 2003(3) SteDenbolKlh Law RevieW~'377400. 
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~angements regarding "old order rights,,,3 arising from an analysis of 
their nature and oonient, in the light of the· constitutional property clause. 
1 t~ Consequences of the transitional provisions 
We have identified three basic sets of consequences for exiSting right 
h.ulders brol:\ght about by the transitional provisions of the MRPD Act.4 
'lie fIrst set arises in the context of 8uccessfulappliCations for conversion 
ot "old order" rights by current holders of such. ~ghts. The question that 
n~ds to be asked in the context of constitutional property protection and 
re&uJ.ation is whether, the degree of imposition on existing rights by the 
cohversion requirements in· each separate case passes_ co~titutional 
llU!l~ter.· Apart from the obvious qUestiOllas to whether 'the Conversions 
anti concomitant restriction of the content of some of these rights amount 
to Gustiflable) deprivations of propt;ty, it must also be determined at 
w.$ch point in the process such possible deprivations take place and must 
be assessed. In some individual cases, the conversions may amount to 
suth severe deprivations that the issue of constructive expropriation may 
arise~ in which case invalidation of the particular conversions, or payment 
of compensation in the alternative must be determined. 
The second set of consequences arises where holders of ttold orderu 
rights are unsuccessful in their applications for conversion of their rights. 
Accordingly the holders would lose their rights altoget1}er in terms of t1;J.e 
MPRD Act. In this context, it must be de~ed whether impositions 
of this nature on ·existing property rights are permitted under the 
Constitution, and whether they qualify as expropriations. If this is the 
case, the question of payment of compensation arises~ If tb.ey· are not 
treated as expr-opriations, the issue to be determined is whethe~ they 
amount to excessive regulation of private property. 
The third ··possible category deals with situations where a current 
holder of an "old order" right chooses not to apply for conversion at all. In 
such ,event, the holder would also.lose the "old orderu right altogether, 
after a- p-eriod of grace as provided by the transitional provisions. Thus 
the question of expropriation and compensation arises iIi this context as 
well. Further, the question as to the exact point at which a possible 
expropriation might occur, needs to be considered. It :may also ·be asked 
whether the "lazy" holder of an "old order right," who does not apply 
for conversion, may at all be eligible to rely on expropriation in order to 
obtain redress for rights .lost on account of a refusal to abide by the 
prescribed procedure for reapplication in the MPRD Act. 
1 2 Course of the inquiry 
Our inquiry in this second part of the contnoution tests the transitional 
3 R.igb.ts reg&1'ding petroleum. exploration and production will not be discussed. 
4 See part one, par 4. ' 
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provisions· of the MRPD Act, and ·specifically the ·consequences thereof 
fls . described above, against ~e' requirements ",for deprivations and 
~propriatiollS of property in teriD.s of the constitutional property.clause. 
Due to limited scope, the conseque~ces of expropriation pertaining to the 
determination. of compensation will not be co~idered. 
The fl"aplework tor jn.terpreta;tion of the property clause as fonnulated 
by the Co'nstitu#onal Gourt~· will 1?e broadly ·summarised first. In the 
course of the present disCus~ion, particu1~ a;ttention will be afforded the ~rob~ema~c scenario~· .sketched .towai;ds. ¢..e end of part o.ne'- Ii is, 
however, necessary to start out with' an overview of the conStitution~ 
requir~ents appliCable in th~ ~ntext· of property regulation and· 
protection. Thereafter. the impli~tions 6f the tran.&itional arrangements 
of the MPRP Act may be aSsessed. 
2 Relevant constHutional r~quir.menJ$ 
The constitutional property·c~ause has a dual function as a protective 
measure against impermissible impositions on private property, and as a 
determinant of the scope of protection afforded to property rights. 
Section 25 read with section 36 of the 1996 Constitution sets out the 
possibilities for Imposing ~pon private property relations within the 
limits set by' the Constitution." It' deals with· the requirements for 
justifiable deprivations and expropriations of property. In assessing the 
impositions made on existing property rights by the. introduction of a new 
mineral rights order, two basic considerations should be kept in mind .. 
These are: (i) the scope of the property concept under the Constitution; 
and (li) the range· of permissible'limitations on property in terms of the 
Constitution. 
;2 1 Basic elements of and· procedure for invoking constitutional 
property protection 
In the constitutional contex~ a two-stage6 procedure i~ envisaged, with 
:which private property· is prott?Cted and according to whicp. the 
boundaries for regulation are.: set. The applicants in eontesti.i:tg the 
'constitp.tion8.lity of a specific imposition oD: property ~t bear the onus 
of proving that an infringement of a property right,. which.is protected by 
section 25, has taken place. As: ~uch the applicants would have to aff:tt.m: 
'(i) that the interest under discussion qualifies for pro·tection under section 
'25; and (li) that an infringement of this interest has. taken place.· Once 
,these issues have been established, the state (or the PartY relying on ·the 
validity of the relevant act) has'the onus of proving that the infringenient 
j---
5 First NalionoJ Bank l' South African Revenue Service 2002 7 BCLR 702 (CC). 
6 Van de£' Walt The Constitulional ·Property Clause (1997) 28; Van der Walt "The Limits of 
Constitutional Property" 1991 SAPR/PL 277. 
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is justified, in terms of both the constitutional property clause and the 
generalliniitations clause.7 
2 1,] The scope of .constitutional property protection 
The Constitution protects property in a "nega~ven clause, by 
excluding deprivations of property in a manner not complying with the 
specifications of the Constitution, rather than by explicitly gu8.r~nteeing 
the right to property. 8. The ~plications of the negative formulati~n of the 
property clause· are still uncertain. Hence it may still be asked. wheth~r 
such a formulation could resUlt in both individual property (or property 
in the "holding" sense) as well as the institution of property (or property 
as a "regime") being protected. Contentions such as these sometimes 
even result' in the argument that section ~5 really protects something "les.s 
than property,,,9 namely the right not to be deprived of property (in the 
case of section 25(1» and the right not to be expropriated (ill the case of 
section 25(2» except as provideCl for in the property clause itself. 
We have dealt with these opinions and stated our ·own considerations 
elsewhere,1O and hence do not prQPose to repeat th~m here, save· to 
submit that convincing arguments exist to accept that Qie full content of 
property - and not something "less than property" - is protected by 
sections 25(1) and (2).11 Moreover, from the South African judiciary's 
treatment of these provisions it is becoming increasingly clear that 
property "holdingsn in the sense of individuals' rights to acquire, hold 
and dispose of property in particular circumstances are protected,12 and 
even· that the protection of property as a "regime" or an institution is 
implicitly endorsed. 13 • . 
Although it is still too early to identify hard· and fast rules about the 
exact scope of constitutionaI property protection in South Mrica,14 the 
judiciary seems inclined towards a broad scope of property protection 
7 Van der Walt Constil.urio11lll Property ClatJse 28 and Van der Walt 1991 SAPRjPL 217. Despite the 
fact that the two-stage approach may be questionable specifically as far as property protection and 
rc:g1J1.a:tion are concerned (see Mostert "Liberty. Social Responsibility and Fairness in the Context of 
Constitutional Property Protection and Regu1a~on" in Botha, AI vd Walt & JMG van der Walt (cds) 
Rights and Democracy "i1J a Tr~ormatiwe ConstitutWn (2004) 140-141). this IUijudicative approach is 
deeply ingrained in the fabric of South African constitutional law. . 
8 S 25(1) of the COnstitution. 
51 See the explanation of this argument in Van der Walt 1991 SAPR/PL 295-313. 
10 Badenhoxst. Pienaar & Mastert Silberberg & Schoemon·'s Law of Property (2003) ch 1 4 1 1; Mostert in 
"Liberty, Social Responsibility and Fairness" in Botba et allUghts and DempcrQCy 131~136. 
II See also the endorsement of this dictum by Ackerman J in the Constitutional Court decision of Firat 
Nalional Bonk v South A.frican Revenue Service 2002 7 BCLR 702 (eC) par so. . 
12 See the reasoning of Ackerman J in the Constitutional Court's ruling of FITSt NQlional Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner. South African Rewen118 Service 20027 BCLR 702 (CC) par 58. 
13 See the analysis of Bt1hrmann , Nkosl2000 I SA 1145 (1'); Nkosi , Bt1Iumtmn 2002 1 SA 372 (SeA); 
First National B(J1Jk of SA Ltd tfa Wesbank v C01'IlI'fdssiOne, South Afrlcan Revenue Service 2001 3 SA 
310 (C); First National BrmJc of SA. Ltd tJa Weshank, Commissioner. South. African Revenue Senice 
2002 7 BeLR 702 (CC) by Mostert "Liberty, Social Responsibility and Fairness" in Botha et al Rights 
and Dl!1'TIl)cracy 131~161. 
14 See Fust NationtlI /kmk of SA. Ltd tla Wesbank , Conrmisswner, South African Rewmue Senice 2002 7 
BCLR 702 (eC) par 54. 
26 SrELL LR" .2004. 1 
under the Constitution. Most o,f the rights relating to the patrimony of 
individuals could be constitution.ally protected by the property clause, for 
instance, against arbitrary enfo~cement of state authority and against an 
"unjust'·' balance of power between individuals inter se, which should be 
eradicated on the initiative of the state. In case of an jmm;nent danger to 
~e common good, or in times of social change, the constitutional 
provisions are capable of beinit."used to correct the effect of private:"law 
principles on the patrimonia1~terests of individuals." But even though 
certain kinds. of property intet~sts are protected or guaranteed by the 
property clause, not" every single property entitlement will necessarily be 
protected or guaranteed in every possible circumStance. The Constitution 
therefore does not protect pr<?perty in the sense of guaranteeing all 
existing property intel'csts absol"~telY against any interference or invasion 
not authorised or consented to:by the owner.1S 
In Lebowa Mineral T'nIst Benefreiaries Forum v President of the 
Republic of South A/rica16 the idea of constitutional protection of mineral 
rights was· erroneously, and rather simplistically, rejected.17 In . our 
submission" the likelihood of protection of mineral, mining and similar 
rights in principle depends on the nature attribp,ted 'to th~ in existing 
law. First, rights originating from private law of property (such as rights " 
to movable or immovable cqrpor~ things and real rights) would 
obviously qualify for protection as constitutional "property.,,18 Hence, 
many of the existing "old order right" types described already would 
qualify for protection in this primary and most obvioUs category of 
:constitutionally protected rights,19 The fact that rights to land, which 
rwould include mineral rights, ate : understood as defInitely falling within 
the wider ambit of the constitutional property clause is underscored by 
ithe explicit mention in section :25(4) of the Constitution that property 
'.should not be interpreted only to'refer to land. 
. The judiciary has, in the second :place, already aclmowledged20' that us~ 
~rights (as opposed to ownership)' With regard to immovable property alSo 
~qualify for protection, even thohgh such rights are usually derived from 
:contract or legislation, and therefore strictly are not protected in the 
:15 Van der Walt ConstitutionoJ Property C1auSe 68. 
,16 2002 1 BCLR 23 (T) 28G-H. 31n:E. 
~7 The tindiBg was based on a mistmc1eIstandmg of the judgment in the so-called "Second Certification 
Case" of the Cobstitutional Court, namely Q:i plJ11e ChaiTperson of me C01l3ti1utional Auembly: In re 
Certification of tire Constitution of the Re~1ic of South Africa 1996 4 SA 1.44 (eq 799, par 74. 
MineIal "rights need not be explicitly ~tioned in ~ of Rights because they receive ample 
p~otection as property under most constitutions. For a discussion of the Ubowa Mineral Trust 
Beneficiaries case. see Bacie:Dhorst &; Vi'ancken. "Do Mineral Rights Constitute 'Constitutional 
:" .Ptopertf'l Lebowa Minerf4TITISI JJeneji#aries Forum l' President o/the RSAo• 2001 Obiter 496 .. 
~& Van der Walt Property Clause 63-66. "". " ~SI In Atto~aI 0/ Lesotho , SwissbourgA DiIIInond Mines (Ply) Ltd 1991 8 BCLa 1122 (Lesotho 
CA) it was held that registered :mining lea.se$ are "property'" protected by the property guarantee • 
. contaDied in. s 9 of the Human Rights Act ~ of 1983 (Lesotho). 
~ Nkosl, Bt1hrman 2002 1 SA 372 (A) par 37.385. See also Van der Walt "Property Rights, v Religious 
Rights: Biihnntmn , Nkosf'.2OO2. stell LR 394414. 
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traditional (private law) property context. Hence there should also be 
room for protection of rights in the mining context created by agreement. 
A third, less ~bvious 'category of protectable interests involves claims 
of property, traditionally based rather in administrative law than in 
property law, and which related to demands against the sUite not based 
on contract,21 but on 'permissions or concessions. ~ese would include 
incorporeal participation rights22 (such as rights to- receive pensions and 
social security) but also, and more importantly for present purposes, 
rights connected to land use permits or traditions.23 The judiciary is still 
cautious to formulate guidelines in this regard,24 and tl?-e contentiousness 
of this third category of possibly protectable interests should be kept in 
mind when assessing the impact of the constitutional property clause on 
the transitional arrangements of the new mineral rights order. For the 
moment; however, there seems to be adequate motivation in existing Case 
law and scholarly work to avoid an outright rejection of the idea that 
mineral rights may qualify as property in terms of at least some categories 
of constitutional protection discussed above. 
2 1 2 Permissible impositions on private property 
The main purpose of the constitutional property guarantee· is not to 
insulate the status quo and the existing position of the individual property 
holder against interference. Rather, section 25 of the Constitution aims to 
establish and maintain,-a balance between existing individual positions 
and the public interest with regard to private property. 2S This often 
ineans that the indiVidual's interest has, without compensation, to be 
subject to controls, regulations, restrictions, levies and other measures 
that advance or protect the public interest.26 Within the constitutional 
framework, individual owners might be free to act with their property, 
21 Reich 1964 Yale. U 73'3-787 calls these interests the "new property'· based on ~'state largesse". 
22 These denote a variety of claims emanating from what is usually understood to be the field of public 
law. Licenses. permits and quotas are included in this category, as well as some ~ghts pertaining to the 
social security and welfare of citizens. Licenses, permits and quotas issued by the state would probably 
be regarded as property and protected if: they have vested in the clltimant and if they are- regarded as 
valuable assets. See Tronskei Public Senants Association v Govenimenl of the Republic of South Africa 
19959 BCLR 1235 (Tk). '-
23 See eg Richtersve/d 11 A/exkor 2000 1 SA 337 (LCC) in which 'benefi~ occupation of land was 
regarded as a protectable interest. In this particular case the consti,tutional objectives were embodied in 
s 2 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, which had to be interpreted by the court. The: 
SCA in this case found that the protectable interest must be typified as a "customary law interest·' 
based on the same legislative piovisi~. RichteTsve1d Community v Alexkor 2003 2 All SA 27 SCA. 
24 This is illustra1M by the decision in Transkei Public Servants Association v Government of the Republic 
of South Africa 1995 9 BeLR 1235 (Tk). which had to be decided in terms of's 28 of the Interim 
Constitution. The validity ofvariQ~ provisions oftbe Tnmskeian Public Service Staft' Code relating to 
hOusing subsidies was at stake. The court refrained from an outright decision with regard to 
constitutional property protection of pension rights (1247 A) but it did acknow~ in an obiter dictum 
tbat the meamng of "property" in s 28 of the interim Constitution might well be sufficieQ,tiy wide to 
encompass a housing subsidy benefit (1246I-1247A). ' • ' 
2S For more detail, -see Mostert Ccmstitutionat Protection and Regulation of Property and its hifIuence on 
the Reform oj Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 393-397. 
26 Van der Walt Constilution8l Property Clause 68. . 
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qut . only within the limits se~ :'by the interests of the public,27 as 
determin~ in tenns' of the ConstitUtion. itself . 
. All.the .rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the general limitations 
c1a1JSe ,of section 3,6,28 which- stipulates the constitutional authority for 
iliniting fundamental 'rights and provides the controlling requirements for 
~Wh a limitation. ~ Section 7(3) of the Constitution supports the-idea that 
seco~n 25 and. section 36 Should be applied cumulatively. 3'~ As for. section 
2?:in particula.r"additional "internal modifying components" help derme 
tl)e content of prOperty.31. w~ additional "specific limitations" 
v,:ithin section 25 itself help dvte . e the justifiability of limitations on 
epnstitutionally prQt~ted property.' rights as espoused by section .36.32 
Por the remainder of this discussfon we will acCept that section.25 and ~ti.on 36 apply cumulatively to inquiries into constitution~ property 
p~otection and .regulation, and that expropriation is a 'subspecies of 
~privation of property. 
2 i 1 2:1 ~equirements for impositions on property· 
Impositions on property will p~ the constitutional scrutiny test, aIid 
q~ as justifiable deprivatio:qs of property, if they are achIeved in 
tePns of a law,33 which must .be of general application,34 and which may 
n~t permit arbitrary limitation3S. of the right to property. Impositions 
amounting to expropriation mUst additionally be for a public purpose or 
in the public interest.36 Expropriations are subject to the payment' of 
cdmpensation, 37 the amount of which should be either agreed upon. by 
the affected Parties, or detetmined' by a court, in which case it has to be 
juSt and eqUitable.38 In any everit, all impositions on property must 
adhere to' the requirem~nt of proportionality.39 
'Z1 ~ Nuwe Sakeregzelike ontwikkelings op iJIe Gebied ,an Grondhervorrning (1997) 6-7. 
28 $ 7(3) of the 1996 Constitution. , . . 
29 Bg the first part of s 36(1) provides the constitutional reference for limitation by the legislature. The 
Second part of s 36(1) provides for a judiciaLconsidera.tion of all relevant factors when limiting a 
tundameutal right. Some of these factors aze:,listed in s 36(1). Thus, two different aspects of the 
principle of proportionality are combined within section 36(1) of the CoDStitutiOri, through the 
ihvolvement of both the 1egis1a.ture and the C9'PJ1S. BJaauw-Wolf""The 'Balancing of Interests' with 
Reference to the Principle of PrOPQ11ioJ;lality 'and the Doctrine. of Gilterabwigung - A Comparative 
Analysis" 1999 SAPR/PL ii0-21 1. . 
30 For a 'more detailed ~t, see Mostert ConrtitutionaI Protection and &gu/ati4n of Property 263-
~76. 
31 l\!(any divergent views exist not only as to the dassification of the different "limiting elements" in s 25, 
but also as to whether and how s 25 should interact with s 36. Van der Walt 1997 SAPR/PL 293 ff 
Wovi(les an expositio~ of th~ approaches. . 
]2 Van del' 'Walt 1997 SAPRjPL 281-282. see further, with regard to the function of.speci.tic limitations 
alul internal modifying components in general. Woolman ~'Out of Ord.et? Out of. Balance. The 
lJolitation Clause of the F"mal. CoJlSt:4ution'" 19rt SAJH~ 108 and De Wa.al ,"A Comparative 
J\nalysis of the PJ;ovisions of. German Origin ip 'the. Interim Bill of Rights" 1995 S4HJR 25-26. 
33 S!~(l) and (2) and s 36(l).ofthe 1996 Constiti.tpon. 
34 S'25(I) and (2) and s 36(1) of,the.19?6 Constitu~on. 
3S S 2S(I) of thO 1996 Constitution. 
16 S: 2S(2)(a) of the 1996 Constitution. 
37.sl25(2)(0) of the 199~ Constitu~on.. See Van,der Walt C01lStitt¢Qnai Property Clause 115. 
38 Si~(3) of the 19~6 Constitution. . 
39 S'36(1) of the 1996.Constitution. 
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(a) Law of general application 
The requirement that only a law 'of general application: may limit 
property'rights appears not only in section 36(1) of the Constitution, but 
also twice in the property clause itself.40 "Law" in' thisc,ontext includes 
statutes and accompanying legislative regu18.tions,' but no~ administrative 
regulations or decrees.41 The democratically elected legislature must 
authorise the limitation, being the organ of state endowed with legislative 
powers. Such authorisation m~t remain within the' ambit of what' has 
been authorised by the Constitution: a- fundamental right must be left 
intact :iIi so far as these, requirements are not met. 
Furthermore, the''1imitation must apply generally and not solely to an 
individual case,' Varying, interpretations ~f this requirement exist; 42 but 
for present purposes' We adhere to th~ idea that the phrase I."generally 
applicable law" refers to the notion of fairness (in the sense of legality, 
certainty cind trust) inherent in the principle of the' rule of law.43 This 
entails a rejection ot a purely formalistic approach, and accepts the 
presence of some degree of legal protection against arbitniry interference 
by public authorities. Such an approach presupposes that the particular 
legal measure (the "gener~y applicable law") should be adequately 
accesSible, and that it should, be formulated with sufficient clarity to 
e:Q.able citizens' to foresee, the consequences of their conduct and to behave 
accordingly.44 
Applied to the new minera11aw order, the MPRD Act is, at face value, 
a ','generally appliqable lawn. Upon closer scrutiny, however" it becomes 
clear that the broad discretionary powers of the M~stry of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs, particular as' concerns the transitional arrangements, 
frequently results in uncertainty as', to the donsequences, in the 
constitutional context, of specific executive actions, and flies in the face 
of the notion of trust underlying the constitutionally endorsed principle 
of the rule of law.45 
(b) N on~arbitrariness and proportionality 
In terms of section 25(1), generally applicable laws imposing on private 
property rights may not be arbitrary.46 In. terms, of section 36(1), such 
law~ must comply with :the requirements of proportionality. Proportion~ 
ality refers to the justifta.bility and rationality of a particular imposition 
40 In s 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution. where deprivations of property are regulated. as well as in s 25(2), 
where expropriation is regulated. 
4l,Blaauw-WoIf 1999 SAPRjPL 178 iT. 
~ For-more detail.- see Mostert Constitutional Prorectit)n ami Regulation of Property 317-320. 
43 For more detail, see Mostert "The Constitu.tional State, the Social State and the Constitutional 
,..Property Clause" 2002 Za6RV 125--127 and Budlender The Constitutional Protectwn of Property 
',lUghts in Budlender, LatskY &. Roux (eels) New Land Ulw (revised 1998) ch 1 26-3~. 
44 Sunday 7'ime3 v United KIngdom 1980 2 ERRR 245 par 49. 
45 S l(c) of the 1996 Constitution. 
~ S 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution. In our submission, expropriation fIlust be regarded as a special 
subcategoIy of deprivation. This means that expropriatory actions would also be subject to the 
requirement of Don~arbitrariness. 
30 STELL LR 2004 1 
on property.47 It also incorporates the idea of·~'.strict" proportionality, 
which entails that competing interests need to be balanced on the basis of 
sp~c requirements listed.in section 36(1)(a) to (e) of the Constitution, 48 
as a final measure of determining constitutionality of specific infringe-
ments. Arbitrariness in the co'ntex~ of impositions on property was 
'initially taken· to denote a lack of criteria governing the exercise of a 
deprivation on property; the ab$ence of a rational connection between 
the interference with property ·and its puIpose; and/or the absence -of 
procedural safeguards.49 There. ·seems to be a good measure of overlie 
between the two concepts of ·,non-arbitrariness and proportionality, 
pspecially if it is taken into accoUnt that ')ustifiability" in the context of 
proportionality necessitates a '~means--ends" analysis as to whether a 
limitation is 'Suitable· or appropriate to achieve a specific objective and 
j'reasonableness" or "rationality~' requires that a limitation may not be 
~'arbitrary, unfair or based upon irrational considerations" and therefore 
constitutes a '.'rational connection" test. 50 The same "ineans-ends" and 
r.'r~tiona.i connection"· analysis .. was applied. with· reference to. non-
f,tIbitrariness in- some of the early Constitutional Court decisions. 51 
~ SinCe the non-arbitrariness requi!ement of section 25(1) is incorporated 
~to the rationality review that forms part of, the proportionality test as 
~equired by section 36(1)~ it might seem as if the arbitrariness of a 
particular law is tested. only Olice the question of proportionality is 
.reached. However, on this point the Constitutional Court in First 
Nationiil Bank v South African Revenue Services2 adopted. an interesting 
.pproach with regard tothe cwnulative application of sections 25 and 36. 
~ckerman J's point of departure was that the internal limitations of 
$ection 25(1) form a "filter" to the true second"stage limitation analysis. 
Accordingly, the non-arbitrarinesS inquiry is· undertaken apart from any 
~ossible PI9portionaliiy review,~. which means that the non-arbitrariness 
~equirement here is regarded ~either as a component of the formal 
~equirement to be met before the:proportionality inquiry commences, nor 
~ an element of the "reasonableness" inqUiry within the proportionality 
, 
#1 S 36(1) mquires that any particu!ar ~tation, introduced by a generally applicable law, must be . 
reasonable andjus1:ifiaqle in an open and deniocmtic society. The specific requirements in 8 36(1)(a) to 
. (e) act as ·aids in determiPing the strict propO¢onality of a specific intiirigement. 
48 See the plea. ofWoolmim ~997 SAJHR 11()'lfi for the rearra.ngement of the factors in s 36(1)(a)-(e) in 
. order to .t:.aciJitate a pr-oper limitation analysiS. 
411 For more detail, see Mostert Con3titut1onali Protection and Regulation of Property 321-329 and 
, Budlender The Constitutional Protection oj Property .Rights ]4..35. 
so B1aauw~Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 178ft: .. 
~n; In S , Lawrence; S , Negal; S, SolbeTg 1997 4 SA 1176 {CG) and. Prinsloo 11 Van tier Lfntie 1997 3 SA 
1012 (CC) this requirement was explained as meaning that a rationaJ connection must exist .between 
means and ends (par 40) in the respective oontexts or .Jimitation ·on tHe right to engage in economic 
actMty (8 26 of the Interim Constitution) and the right to equality (8 8 of the Interim Constitution). 
Non-compliance with this requirement, according to the Court, would be arbitrary and "incompatible 
with a society [based on freedom and equality)". -
S2jFYrst National Btmk 11 Sputh Africqn Rnenue SerWce 2002 7 BeLR 702 {CC). 
S3 It is indiaIted '8.t par- 11 S that this inquiry focused on :the issue of whether a rational connection existed 
between the deprivation and the pmpose for it. after it was indicaied at par lO5(g) that this type. of linquiry is but one fUnction of the req~t· of Don..:arbitrariness. 
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test itself. 54 Non~arbitrariness is referred to as a "wider concept" and a 
"broader controlling principle," which stretches beyond a mere 
rationality review, whilst, simultaneously, it also represents a "narrower 
and less intrusive concept than that of the proportionality evaluation 
required by ... section 36" of the Constitution.5s 
Although this statement might seem contradictory at first glance, it 
makes perfect sense in view of the fact that rationality review is but a 
single component of the 'over-all proportionality test. It is somewhat 
inconsistent of t1;te court to refer to the proportionality test of section 36 
whilst explicitly expecting the non-arbitrariness requirement (which is an 
intemallimitation of section 25) to be met before one caD. proceed to the 
limitation analysis of section 36. With this approach, however, the court 
manages to straddle the gap between the two ~eparate stages of the 
constitutional property inquiry, by introducing a particular type of 
"fairness" inquiry in.to the fIrst stage, when the existence of an imposition 
on property has to be determined. The Constitutional . Court thUS 
acknowledges a flexible norm imposed by the arbitrariness requirement: 
the non-arbitrariness of limitations may be relevant and applicable at 
practically any point in the" inquiry, depending on the specific context in 
which it is applied. 
The transitional provisions of "the MPRD Act, in as far as they cross 
the constitutional property clause, may accordingly be subjected either to 
strict rationality review, or to a broader test of rationality and 
justifiability, or to both at various stages of the constitutionality inquiry. 
In order to determine the arbitrariness or proportionality of the various 
transitional arrangements of the MPRD Act, the specific consequences 
thereof in each individual case need to be considered. This will necessitate 
a return (in paragraph 3 below) to the three sets of consequences of the 
transitional provisions as explained in part one of our contribution. S6 
( c) Public purposes or public interest 
Deprivations amounting to expropriation must be for a public purpose 
or in the public interest. 57 No definition is provided in the Constitution of 
the terms public purpose or public inter~st, but section 25(4) of the 1996 
ConstitUtion determines that, for the purposes of the property clause, the 
public interest "includes the nation's commitment to land reform. n Both 
terms have been subject to varying interpretations in South Mrican 
property law,58 but they were never really carefully analysed. 
54 Par 73 . 
• 55 Par 6%. -
56 See Part One, Par 4. " 
57 S 2S(2)(a) of the 1996 Constitution. 
S See Rlmdebosch Munidpal Councu 11 Trustees of the We8tem Province "Agricultural Society 1911 AD 
271; FOUrie 11 Minister van Lande 19704 SA 165 (0); WhIte Rocks Fann"(Pty) Ltd 11 Minister of 
Co11U1lU1lity Dnelopment 1984 3 SA 774 (WLD). 
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Existing case law about the meaning of these terms is furthermore not 
adequate "ror application in th~ constitutional context. Expropriation for 
racially discriminatory and social restructuring purposes in South Africa 
has in the past simply been upheld - or not questioned - as constituting a 
public pur.pose or being'in -the'public interest. 59 The cases in which the 
courts did attempt to 'interpret these terms'raise further problems in 
endeavours to discern how brdad or narrow the scope- of public interest 
or public purp'oses should be:in the context of constitutional property. 60 
Deciding whether a specific legislative measure is for a public purpose 
or fu the public interest invariably involves policy choices. Since South 
Mg,can courts in the past have generally been somewhat cautious in 
making such choices, it could be argued that the term public interest in 
section 25(2)(a) of the Cemstitntion emphasises the fact that the courts' 
, , 
powers to set aside expropriations on the grounds of their purpose are 
limited.61 It is questionable~'J1owever, whether a strict, "hands off" 
approach in this context is necessarily always appropriate. The counter-
argument, accordingly, may be"that the inclusion of the public purposes 
or public interest standard in ~on 25(2) of the Constitution is aimed at 
curbing abuse of legislative and executive power. This would call for an 
increase in the sanctioning powers of the judiciary beyond a mere resp~ 
for the decisions of the legislatUre and executive. The provision in section 
25(4) of the Constitution, that the public interest would include the 
nation's commitment to Ian4 :reform and reform. to ensure, equitable 
access to natural resources, uia,y then be understood as a pointer, to the 
judiciary, as to how the legisl.ture and executive should exercise their 
powers with regard to determining policies affecting private property. 
59 Leg;sIation aimed at giving effect' to the segregation policy under' apartheid also frequently made 
specific reference to "pubJie purpose" (eg $ 13(3) of the Development and Trust Land Act 18 of 1936). 
The courts also frequently upheld Ie@slation permitting expropriation for purposes Df social 
rest:ructuring which were racially discriminatory fDr being in the public interest or for the public weal 
(eg Minfster of the Interior V Lockhat 1961 2 SA 587 (A). 602E-F). Alternatively, racially 
dise.riminatory actions by the state 'were not questioned by the courts on the basis of pllQlic purpose 
or public interest (see eg the submission of Mohamed. Cba$kaJson, Corbett, Van Heerden and Langa 
to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, reproduced in Sunday Independent 1997-10-19 11). 
150 The cases in whiqb. the courts did attempt ttl interpret the terms public purposes a.t;ld fJUl?lic interest can. 
at best, provide only rather vague guidelines for interpretation of these terms in: the new constitutional 
order. This is due to: (i) reservations concerning the question of whethm: these terms should be 
interpreted broadly or narrowly (see the exposition in Rondebosch Municipal Cuuncil 11 TTUStees o/.the 
W~iem Province A.gricu4ural Society Hill AD 271); Cn) u.ncertainty about ,whether precedent on the 
meaning of these terms "Outside the context, of expropriation legislation would have an influence on its 
interpretation within the context of expropriation (compare Rontlebosch Municipal Council II TT'U3tees 
o/the Western Province Agricultural Society 1-911 AD 271; Fourill 11 Minister van L4ntle 19704 SA 165 
,(0); White Rocks FIlI'm (Pty) Ltd, Minister ofCommuriity De'w!/opmel2t 1984 3 SA 774 (WLD)); and 
(m) uncertainty about the questions wbether these terms in the conteKt of expropriation requires actual 
use of the land by the expropriator and whether expropriation of one individual for the benefit of 
another would qualify as being in the public interest or for pubfu: purposes (see Administrator. 
Ti'annQQ/ 11 J van StI'eepen (Kempton PQlk) (Pty) Ltd 19904 SA 644 (A). For a more detailed 
discussion of these ~ see Mostert Co-""titutional Protection anti Regulation of Property 333-340. 
61 CbaskaJson " le\"ris in Cbaska1son, Ken~dge, K1aaren et al (eds) Constilution;al Law of $0Ulh A.frica 
(1996) ch 31 22 describe the presence of this term. in s 25(2) as a warning to the judiciary to respect the 
choices made by the Ie&Wature or the exeCutive as to where the pnblic intereSt lies. 
REVISITING THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 33 
This becomes particularly important if one considers the t~itiona1. 
provisions of the MPRD Act in conjunction with sections 3(1), 3(2)(a) 
and 110 of the same Act. As we have indicated in part one,62 section 3(1), 
which states that mineral resources are the common heritage of all the 
people of South Africa and that the state is the custod!an thereof for the 
benefit of all South Africans, by itself probably has no noteworthy 
consequences for proprietary distribution in South Africa. It is not really 
significant whether ownership of unsevered minerals is vested in the state 
or the "people of South Africa." Rather, the important question is in 
whom specific rights to prospect or mine minerals are vested. It could 
probably be accepted, therefor~, that the language of section 3(1) is 
merely an example of the social-democratic rhetoric frequenting a broad 
range of more recent legislative measures, without that the section 
actually conveys any rights to the state.63 Accordingly, section 3(1) most 
probably does not result independently in an .~utright, full-scale 
nationalisation of mineral resources. Section 110, however, repeals or 
amends all the "old order" rights, s:ubject to the transitional provisions of 
Schedule II, to the extent set out in the third column of Schedule 1. 
. The public interest in endowing the su..te, with custodianship of mineral 
resources should accordingly be viewed against the socio-democratic 
considerations enumerated in the Act's objectives and the need for 
equitable distribution of land and related resources which lie at the heart 
of 'and are endorsed· by our Constitution. In particu1a~, economic 
empowerment· objectives,64 along with the notion. of growth and 
development and the idea of sustainable use of ·natural resources 
articulated by the section 2 of the MPRD Act, :are significant to 
determine which impositioils on property would be in the public interest, 
justifying expropriation. However, section 3(2) of the Act grants the 
minister - as agent of the state-as-custodian - broad discretionary powers 
of control and disposal of mineral rights. We submit that the effect of 
these ·sections can be assessed only upon a consideration of particular 
transitional arrangements operating in conjunction with sections 2 and 
3(2) of the Act. In an inquiry into whether the public interest is served. 
with a specific imposition, or whether a specific action undertaken in 
term$ of th~ Act is for a public purpose, the consequences of that 
particular action or transitional arrangement should thus contribute to 
the assessment. We will accOrdingly return to this Issue in paragraph 3 of 
this discussion, where some of the individual consequences of the 
transitional arrangements are reviewed. . 
62 Part one, par 1 i. 
63 With the abrogation of the cuius est solum, rule ownership of unsevered minemIs bas become possible. 
.If it can be argued that a new res or thing (despite difficulty with the characteristic of independence) 
has been created it could perhaps be classified as public things (res publicae) •. See further in general, 
Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Property 34. 
64 See Badenhorst "Saving the Pieces of the Mineral Law System: Keeping the Baby and the Bath~ter'· 
2003 Obiter 54 ff. 
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(d) . Compensation 
Expropriations are subject ~ to the payment of compensation,6S the 
amount of which should be .either agreed upon by the affected parties, or 
determined by a court, in which case "it has to be just and equitable, and 
has to reflect a balance between the interests of the public and those 
affected by the expropriation.66 Contrary to the situation in most other 
legal systems, the South Mriean property clause also provides some 
indications as to how the justness and equitability of the compensation 
amount should be determined.:: These include, but are not limited to: (i) 
the current use of the property;: (ii) the history of the acquisition and use 
of the property; (iii) the market value of the property; (iv) the extent of 
direct state investment and s~bsidy in the acquisition and beneficial 
capital improvement of the ~:property; ·and (v) the purpose of the 
expropriation.67 
Although many of the spe,cific examples of imposition under the 
MPRD Act eventually raise the need to turn to a determination of the 
amount of compensation payable, the scope of our ·contribution does not 
allow detailed analyses in this regard. This "issue needs to be reserved for a 
subsequent, separate inquiry. Eor the moment, a few general comments 
about the provision for compensation in the MPRD Act will have to 
suffice. 
The MPRD Act now concedes that expropriation without sufficient 
compensation may take place upon implementation of the transitional 
measures.68 It accordingly provides for claims of compensation against 
the state in Schedule ll.69 These:provisions need to be read alongside the 
constitutional requirements for compensation in section 25(3). Item 12(3) 
of Schedule IT requires that, ~art from sections 25(2)" and (3) of the 
Constitution, the following be 1.-t'aken into account in determining a just 
and equitable amount of conipensation in the context of the MPRD Act." 
First, the ~tate is' obligeq ~9 redress the results. of past racial 
discrimination in the allocation" of and access to mineral resources.70 It 
must also, secondly, bring about reforms to promote equitable access to 
all South Africa's natural resources.ll Thirdly, the provisions of section 
25(8) of the Constitution, which enables the state to take legislative and 
other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to 
redress the results of past racial discrimination within the limits of the 
6S S 25(2Xb). See Van deE Walt COTJItitutioMl Property Clause 115. 
66 S 25(3). 
fi1 For detailed comments on the meaning or each of theSe requirements. see· Mostert Constitutional 
Property- Protection tm4 RBgu1atiLm 34S-~9; Van der Walt Constitutional Property C/ausea -·A 
Comparative .A.nolysis 346-347. i; 
.68 Item. 12(1) of Schedule II to the MPRD ACt. 
~ See item 12. Paymmrt: of compensation is, however, not stated as an objective of the transitional 
measures (see item 2). and apparently is a power apart from. that of the Dli:nis1:er to expropriate 
property for the "purpose of prospecting or mining in s 55. 
!to Item 12(3Xa) of Schedule IT to the MPRD.Act. 
11 Item 12(3)(b) of Schedule IT to the MPRD Act. 
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general limitations clause must be heeded.72 Finally ~ it must -also be 
determined whether the person concerned will continue to benefit from 
the use of the property in question.73 
A clann in terms of item 12 of Schedule II has to· be lodged in the 
prescribed manner with the Director-General of ihe Department of 
Minerals and Energy. 74 The successful c1ajrnant of comPensation in terms 
of the MPRD Act will have (i) proved the extent and nature of actual loss 
and damage suffered; (li) indicated the current use of the property; (iii) 
proved his or her ownership of the property involved; (iv) provided an 
aecount of the history of acquisition of the property in question and the 
price paid for it; (v) provided detail of the nature of such property; (vi) 
proved the market value of the property and the manner in which such 
vallie was determined; and (vii) indicated . the extent of any state 
assistance and benefits received i.:ri respect of such property. 75 
The last-minute additions and alterations to item. 12 of Schedule II to 
the MPRD Act~ along with bad draughtsmanship, render these 
provisions problematic. The compensation provisions are apparently 
not conn~cted in any way to the -only other reference to- expropriation in 
the Act, namely section 55.76 The phrasing and structure of these 
·provisions render it difficult, moreover, to link them with the other 
transitional proVisions, since no cross-referencing to the compensation 
provisions exist, and in fact no -other commitment as to the possibly 
expropriatory effects of the transitional provisions are made. 
The prescribed procedure for claiming compem;ation in terms of items 
12(2) and (4) apparently applies to any expropriation of property, 77 and 
not only to. the possible expropriations in terms of tJ:1e transitional 
provisions, even though the provision appears in the schedule of 
transitional arrangements. This provision indicates, nevertheless (albeit 
on a very basic level), that an expropriatory intention underlies some or 
all of the provisions of the MPRD Act. It nevertheless. leaves lawyers, 
judges, and indeed the relevant executive authorities in the dark as to 
exactly-which arrangements amount to expropriation. this in turn gives 
rise t() the question as to whether some of the provisions were intended 
only as deprivations, which might then possibly "go too far.,,·78 
The most obvious-explanation of the incorporation of these provisions 
muSt be that they represent an attempt by the legi.sla~ure to avoid the 
Constitutional Court striking down any expropriatory measures on the 
basis that the scrutiny test of section 25(2) and (3) h~ not been passed. 
All in all, however, the terms and applicative scope of item 12 remain so 
72 Item 12(3)(c) of Schedule n to the MPRD Act 
73 Item 12(2){d) of Schedule II to the MPRD Act. 
74 ltool 12(4) of Schedule n to the MPRD Act. 7' Item 12(2) of Schedule II to the MPRD Act. 
76 See n 69 above. 
T1 Itmn 12(1) of Schedule II to the MPRD Act 
78 See Steinberg" south Peninsula Municipality 2001 4 SA 1243 (SCA) par 8; First NatiD'llQ/Jlank " South 
African -kvenue Sentce 2002 7 BCLR 702 (CC) par 114. 
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vague that they raise·concerns 'as to whether these provisions comply with 
the constitutional principle of the rule oflaw,79 which requires certainty 
about and predictability of state action.80 
2 1·2 2 Deprivations, expropnations and co"nstructive expropriations 
As concerns the constitutionality of the MRPD· Act's transitional 
provisions, one of the frequently ~sed issu~s relates to the nature of a 
particular destruction or conversion of ~xisting rights un<ier the Act, in 
view of the constitutional provisions of deprivations and expropriations. 
In order to assess the implications of the constitutional requirements for 
property protection and regulations for the neW mineral rights ord~r, it is 
necessary to focus on the .distinction between deprivations. and 
expro~tions. 
(a) Deprivations of property 
In a certain sense, any imposition on the use, enjoyment or exploitation 
of private property involves so~e kind of deprivation for the title or right 
holders of the property conce~ed.81 The term "deprivation~" of property 
results from the wording of seCtion 25(1). It denotes all impositions on 
property, also expropriations. The transitional provisionS of the MPRD 
Act may be regarded· as regulations· of existing property rights, where 
their effect is to impose on such existing rights. The transitional 
provisions either .impose additional duties on existing right holders to 
ensure continuation of their rights, or they result in a substitution of "old 
order" rights with "new order~' rights that are not as extensive in content 
as the "old order" rights which preceded them. Only in two instances, as 
has been indicated in part one of our inquiry,82 the conversi9n of "old 
order" rights into "new order" rights actually result in a broadening of 
the content of such entitlements. 
In 'essence, an· imposition on property amounts to an unconstitutional 
deprivation if it infringes section 25(1) and cannot be justified· under the 
general limitations clause (section 36 of the Constitution).83 According to 
the two-stage approach, the holder of an existing "old order'.' rig4t may 
want to challenge the transitional arrangements if it can be indicated that 
these result either in a reduction or in a destruction of their rights. The 
state will then have to prove that such a deprivation is justified. The 
irequirements to be met in order for a deprivation of property to pass 
r 
j79 S I(c) of the Constitution. 
!SO See in general Mostert Constitutional ProtectiOn and Regulation of Property 126.134 and Rautenbach 
! General Provisions of the South .A..frictm Bill of Rights (1995) 89. 
in FIrst Nati(Jna1 Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbtmk , Commissioner /01' South African Revenue 
, Services 2002 7 BCLR 102 (eC).par 57., . 
82 Part one, par 4. 
~ See Frr3r Nado7ull Bank" South African Revenue Service 2002 7 BCLR 702 (CC) par.5s-.S9; ChaskalSOQ 
& Lewis Property in Chaskalson, Kentrldge ~ at (eds) Co1l8titutiont.d Law a/South Africa (1996) ch 31, 
14. 
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constitutional scrutiny entail that the imposition must be effected by a 
law of general application,~ which is 'not arbitrary,8s, and tha~ the 
imposition must be reasonable and justifIable in an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality .86 
(b)" Expropriati(Jns o/property 
Even if the imposition on property qualifies as a justifiable deprivation 
of property, because it meets the consti:~utional requirements of section 
25(1) and section 36 as listed above, it remains to be determined whether 
the" particular imposition on property was intended to be an expropria-
tion. In the latter case, the a:dditional requirements under section "25(2) 
and (3) of the Constitution must be met.87 In particular, compensation is 
payable to the property right holder affected by the expropriation, if it is 
to be permissible "under the Constitution. The expropriation furthermore 
"must be in the public interest or for a public purpose. An additional 
requirement niight be posed by existing case law88 and practice89 - that 
the "expropriation must result in the appropriation by. another party or 
the state of the specific rights taken away from one party.90 No 
justification exists for this ~ewpoint in the constituti~nal context,91 but 
the yiew "seems to be frrmly ingrained in the structure' of South African 
expropriation law.92 The implications of importing such a requirement in 
the context of the transitional provisions of the M~RD Act will b~ 
conSidered below with reference to specific scenarios. For the moment, it 
remains to be ~dicated that the Constitution also "does not require" 
expropriation to be permanent in nature.93 Expropriations. being 
subspecies of deprivations of propertr4 Under the" Constitution ne~, 
however, to comply with all requireme;nts set for deprivations in section 
25(1) read with section 36 of the Constitution. 
84 S 25(1) and 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
IS S"25(l) of the 1996 Constitution. 
86 S 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
rI See n 83 above. 
88 &e Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (1) 5i5A..c and also Harksen v Lane 
" NO and Others 1998 1 SA 300 (eC) 316A.oC. 
89 Gildeohuys Onleteningsreg 2 eel (2002) 117-121. 
!IO Badenhorst "ProPertY and the Bill of Rights" in Butterworths' Bill 0/ Rights Compendium (ISSUe 3) 
3FB-29; Badenhorst"""Die Ven:istes vir 'n Geldige Onteieningsk:ennisgewing" 1989 THRHR 130, 137-
.138. GildenhuYs Onteieningsreg 8. Justification for this stance is sought in the decision of Harksen v 
Lane NO and Others 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) 3ISG-H. However, the latter decision is criticised on this 
point in particular. See "Van der Walt & Botba "Coming to Grips with the New Constitutional Order: 
Critical Comments on Hark&en w Ume NO" 1998 SAPRIPL 1741. 
91 For detailiJ, see Mostert "CDnstiluttonoJ Protection ~ Regulation of Property 350-3S1. 
92 Badenhorst 1989 THRHR 130 ff; GUdenhuys Onteieningsreg 117-123. 
93 For details, see Mostert Constitutional Protection and"Reguiation of Property 351~352. 
94 Van der Walt "'Moving towards RJ:cognition of Constructive Expropriation? Stemherg v SOuth 
Peninsula Municipality" 2002 THRHR 469. " 
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( c) The third category: 'constructive expropriations 
The manner in which the requirements for impositions on property are 
dealt with under the Constitution could leave room for the import of a 
,further, implicit category of impositions, namely "constructive expropria-
:tions," "regulatory takings" or '~inverse condemnations." A legislative or 
ladmjnistrative measure which h~ the effect of removing or destroying all 
'the rights from a. particular 'property holder (whether or not a 
Frrespo~ding advantage is gnmted to' ~e exp.ropriat~r or another 
\Party), Without the payment of. compensation bemg enVlsaged, can be 
'described as a constructive expropriation.95 The important point to keep 
In mind in this cOntext is that, even if nothing in the particular legislative ~r administrative measure is meant to be an expropriation (or even 
obviously resembles an expropri~tion), the effect of the measure may still 
,esult. factually in expropriation. . 
The relation between the first and second subsections of the property 
¢Iause influences the assessment of the difference between deprivations 
fmd expropriations, as well as the question as to whether South African 
law is .. open to either a "doctrine of constructive expropriation" or at least 
bm.e argument to the same effect. The most important consideration in 
fhis regard is that the requirements set in section 25(1) seem to overlap to 
fome extent, but not completely, with those set for expropriations in 
r.erms of section 25(2). The tvi.P subsections converge as far as the 
requirements for impositions on',property to be undertaken by laws of 
~eneral application are concerned. They diverge on the matters of non-
arbitrariness (which appears in section 25(1», and public interest and 
~mpensation (which appears in:: section 25(2». As has been indicated, 
90th subsections must be read along with the requirements for 
justifiability and rationality in section 36 of the Constitution. 
I Constructive expropriation would typically be raised where the state 
does not directly, explicitly' or formally expropriate the property, but 
rather imposes such severe regulations on particular property rights that 
llayment of compensation would be the natural and fair consequence 
thereof, in lieu of an invalidation of the particular (set of) imposition(s) 
on propertY.96 The "exact exten\ to which a doctrine of inverse 
4Ondemnation or constructive expropriation will be "imported into. South 
Mrican law is not yet clear. 
; Even though this contributiont does not allow much. scope to develop 
i~eas about the applicability of ?<>nstructive expropriation in the South 
Mriean context, it needs to be indicated that until recently, basically two 
strands of ideas influenced the import of such a doctrine into our law. 
!IS Van der Walt .. Compensation for Excessive or Unfair Regulation.: A Comparative OVerview of 
Constitutional Practice re1ating to Regulatory Takings" 1999 SAPR/PL 273-331; Van der Walt 
"Towards a Theory of Rights in Property: Exploratory Observations on the Paradigm. of Post-
. Apartheid Property Law" 1995 SAPRjPL 310. 
~'Van derWalt 1995 SAPRIPL310; Van derWl:1lt.}999 SAPRIPL273-331; Van derWait 2002 THRHR 
459-470. 
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In Harksen v Lane~~7 an approach to deprivation and expropriation of 
property which views these as separate, non-related and non-continuous 
categories of imposition was suppqrted.98 Scholars opine that, through 
this categorical stance, the question as to the introduction of constructive' 
expropriation into South Mrican law was negated implicitIy.99 One 
would actually expect that a categorical distinction between deprivation 
and expropriation would render ne~sary an admission of the need for 
. that "grey area" in which regulations that have gone too far could fall. 
Nevertheless, the Harksen court's approach renders it impossible to claim 
compensation on the basis of excessive regulation. It is equally impossible 
upon the approach in Harksen to request the striking of a specific 
legislative measure because it creates an imposition 1;hat should have 
complied With other requirements than those set for deprivations. The 
matter is complicated further by the Harksen court's reliance on the 
common-law quality attributed to expropriations, concerning the 
requirement of appropriation by or transfer to the expropriator.lOO. 
In Steinberg v South Peninsula Municipality.l~1 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal seems to favour the idea that deprivations and expropriations are 
rlifferent points on a single continuum, expropriation being a particular 
species of deprivation.102 Along with this view, the court acknowledges, 
albeit in non-binding terms, the incorporation of some measure of inverse 
'TI Barben II Ltme NO and Another 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC). 
98 The decision haS been thoroughly analysed at vario~ occasions. See eg Van der Walt, CoflStitutionaJ 
Property Clauses-A Comparative Analys13 (1999) 338 if; Van derWalt & Botha 1998 SAPRIPL 17-
41. It had to be decided whether a statutory provision (8 21(1) or the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936) 
resulting in (solvent) spouses of persons enmeshed in insolvency proceedings temporarily losing their 
property to the Master of the Court. was in conflict with, inter alia, the (mterim) constitutional 
property guarantee. The Constitutional Court's decision did not support the argument that this 
provision was in conflict with the property clause, because it constituted an expropriation of the 
solvent spouse's proPertY without providing for compensation. The court chose to base' the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation on the question of whether ownership is 
transfened to a public authority for a public purpose (par [32]-[34D. The court's choice of 
expropriation, rather than deprivation, as point of ~ is open to m:Iticism. The. purpose of 
the particular statutory provision resembles the logic of forfeiture or confiscation of property more 
closely tha,n it resembles the logi~ of expropriation. Ironically, the reasoning of the Barksen court 
supports, without explicitly acknowledging, the idea that the relevant proVision has a regulatory, 
mther than an e.x.propriatory character, in that it is aimed at ensuring protection of creditors of an 
insolvent estate by avoiding the unlawful or fraudulent transfer of property belonging to the insolvent 
to the separate estate of the sOlvent spouse. 
99 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause 116. 
100 See the discussion in n 98 above. 
101 The question as to the introduction of the doctrine of constructive expropriation into South African 
law was left open in Steinberg v South Peninsula Municipality 2001 4 SA 1243 seA:Par 8, although the 
judgment seemed to indicate a positive dis.position towards the incorporation of some of the elements 
of the doctrine. 
102 This .case involved an application for an order directing the municipality to complete the process of 
.expropriation foreseen for prQperty belonging to the appellant Under South: African law, approval of 
a road scheme does not· bind the relevant state authority to implement such a scheme at any point 
·(1245F-H). The. contention before the court was that the uncertainty surrounding the implementation 
.of the .road scheme rendered the appellant unable to develop or imPl:Ove the property, and 
immobilised any alienation of the land, thereby depriving her of the economic value of her land. The 
court distinguished between deprivati.on and expropriation on the basis of the required payment of 
compensation, and the need to regulate private property for the public good without incurring 
tiability for compensation (1246 B-C). . 
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co:p.q,emnation into . our . Iaw.l~ It is argued104 that the continuum 
approach permits a reliance on :the doctrine' of constructive expropria-
I 
tion. This. is apparently in line with the general structure and tenor of the 
Constituti.on~ and 'with the situation in many other jurisdictions," where 
the focus is placed· on question~bout the constitutional reasonableness 
and justiflability of Iimitatioils :'hn the proteCted property right, rather 
:than the exact definition and S9Qpe of the right itself. The continuum 
fapproach anticipates the existenc,e of a '''grey area" between deprivations 
land expropriations. In this "grey area" deprivations. that have "gone too 
;rar" attract the more stringent re,quil;ements set for a valid expropriation~ 
lin particular the requirement 'of qompensation. One would expect that the 
!need for a doctrine of constrUet.ive expropriation would not arise if 
'eXpropriation were regard~ as ~. subspecies of deprivation, because the 
\continuum would ~ply catch up with any regulation that is "going too 
far" , and treat it as an expropriation, requiring adherence to the 
additional prerequisites. This, however, would lose sight of the 
~nsideration that expropriations need to be intended as such to be 
~eated as such. rJlere is very little constitutional justification for judicial 
creativity in treating impositiol1s' resembling the logic of deprivations 
Pnder section 25(2) and expecttp.g payment of compensation where the 
legislature considered it unnecessary to provide for such on the .basis of 
"the general impeding effect of a specific imposition on a class of property 
holders. . 
I 
, It seems, therefore, as if both the categorical and the continuum 
~pproaches may expose the judiciary to dilemmas, albeit of different 
~tures, should either' ot them form.. the basis of a possible ~octrine of 
constructive expropriation. . 
! The ground-breaking decision of the Constitutional Court in FNB. v 
$ARS10S creates a new range' of possibilities for the. doctrine of 
~onstructive expropriation. The existenCe thereof would depend on the 
$tandard of non-arbitrariness' where this is employed to' determine the 
circumstances .under which a re8uIation would have "gone too far" or 
would have "cast the net too wide. ul06 Arbitrariness is linked to the lack 
103 The coUrt acknowledged that" there may be room to develop a narrow doctrine of const:ructive 
expropriation for the South African context;.hl cases where a public body utilises its power to regulate 
pri\'ate property SO excessively that it may ~ characterised as a 'deprivation which has the effect 0/ 
indirectly transferring those rights to the public body (l2469-241H). Admitting that deve10pment of a 
'doctrine of constructive expropriation may induce confusion in the law and may hainper the 
. constitutional imperative of land reform. (l2,48A-B), the court eventually left open the question as to 
the rieed to develop a doCtrine of con.str-oCtive expropriation in South Africa.. It found, instead, that 
appro~ of the road scheme amouuUXl to nothing more than an "advance notification of a possible 
intention to construct a ro~ which if implemented in the form. approved, would result .in a taking" 
. (1249B-F).· . 
104 Van der Walt Constitutkmtzl'Property Clauses - CompfITatWe Analysis 358: 
lOS First Natirpwllktnk l' South African Revenue Service 2002 7 BCLR 702 (CC). 
106 See par 114 of the decision. . . 
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of sufficient reason in a law for an imposition on propertY:J 107 or to 
procedural unfairness. The ~urt explicitly indicates that where land" or 
corporeal mov~ble property is at stake, the purpose for deprivation will 
have to be more compelling than where the property does not qualify "as 
land or corporeal movables or where the property rights are less 
extensive. Likewise, where the deprivation is all-embracing, a more 
compelling purpose will have to be established than in the case where 
only some incidents of the property are affected, or where they are only 
partially affected. As has been indicated above already, the court 
supports the idea that the meaning of non~arbitrariness fluctuates,108 as a 
result of which sufficient reason will sometimes be established by "no 
inore than a mere rational relationship between means and ends," whilst 
in other circumstances it will call for a full~blown proportionality review 
in terms" of section 36(1)" of the Constitution. Although the issue of 
constructive expropriation is never raised explicitly, the manner in which 
the court uses the arbitrariness r~uirement to determihe the constitu~ 
tionality of the specific imposition on property leaves no doubt that an 
inquiry as to possible remuneration for e~cessive regulation would be 
unnecessary. The irilplication ther€?Of is that an argument of constructive 
expropriation would be relevant in instances where the constitutionality 
of a specific legislative regtJ.l.ation of property is under scrutiny, and not 
Where an individual affected by a state imposition on hisfher property 
requires compensation outside the confmeS of section 25(2). This is, in 
any event, the result that" may be reached if a deprivation of property is 
contested for being excessive. 
As must be apparent from the" preceding discussion, the question as to 
the import of some "kind of "doctrirte" of constructive expropriation is by 
no means resolved yet. Due to the uncertainty still "existing in this regard, 
it is for. present purposes necessary to keep in mind the possibilities 
offered by the acknowledgement of this potential third category of 
impositions on property. We shaU assume that any" possible South 
Mri~ model of constructive expropriation will at least acknowledge the 
fact that in spite of a lack of formal expropriation, a specific imposition 
on property by the state is prone to be constitutionally conWSted because 
of its excessive effect or unfair impact on an individual property holder. 
Accordingly the issue of constrUctive expropriation would arise where 
actions are seemingly nothing more th~ deprivations~ but nevertheless 
effectively aestroy the eConomical viability of the property or a cOre 
element of the property right, whilst (additionally) affording no direct 
penetit to the authority effecting the imposition on pr.opelj.y. 109 Hence, 
~though no expropriation was intended, the effect of the specific 
imposition on the rights" of the property holde~ is so extensive' ~at the 
107 See par 105 of the decision. 
108 See par lOS(g) of the decision. 
10!il Van der Walt 1995 SAPRJPL 310. 
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p:roperty may just as well havf been expropriated. ,Contesting such an 
imposition on property may resUlt in the enforcement of the provisions in 
section 25(2) regarding paynle~t of compensation. Alternatively, it may 
invalidate the excessive regulatbry imposition on property .110 
In the final section of this 'contribution we concentrate on specific 
examples of conver~on or ~estruction of rights in terms of the 
transitional provisions of the MPRD Act, specifically to determine how 
the prQ.visions on deprivation and expropriations under the Constitution 
operate in the context of the Act. 
3 CQnstlt..nlonal property review in specific instances under the 
M'PRDAct 
The three identified sets of consequences resulting from the tr~itional 
provisions of the MPRD 'Actl11 have the effect ~ither 'of converting 
existing "old order" rights in~o "new order" rights (in the case of 
succeSsful applications for conversion); or of destroying existing rights 
altogether (in the' event of uns\Iccessful applications for conversion, or 
where no application ,for copversion is submitted). In effect, the 
transitional provisions aim at d~troying all existing "old order" rights, 
and reissuing similar rights up~n successful applications for conversion. 
Whilst aware of the fact that· we deal in the broad sense with two 
instances of destruction of rights in our discussion below, we attempt to 
import some measure of distinction by labelling the first set "destructions 
proper," referring to those cases where rights are'destroyed altogether 
and not substituted at all; and tP.e second set ~~conversions.~', referring to 
those cases where rights ~e destroyed, but replaced by ·new order rights 
due to successful applications' for converSion or new rights. 
3 1 "Proper" destruction of rights 
As concerns the destruction of old order rights without substitution by 
any type of new order right, impositions on private property rights may 
occur on various differ-ent levels: 
3 1 1 Unsuccessful applications for conversion, 
First, mineral (or similar) rigl:J.t~ held by third parties may be destroyed 
altogether in terms of the ~tional provisions if the existing holders of 
such rights are unsuccessful ii:t aPePlications for conversion. This raises the 
issue of whether such destructiQn of rights qualifies as expropriation. in 
terms of the Constitution, or if it does not; whether compensation should 
in any event be payable on the bitsis of the severe effect the unsuccessful 
,application has on the individual right holder. 
110 Van der Walt 2002 THRHR 459470. 
; U1 See Part one, par 4. 
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Item 12(1) to Schedule II of the Act provides that "any person who can 
prove that his or her property has been expropriated in terms of any 
provision of the Act may claim compensation from the State." Hence 
parties affected by circumstances as described above will first have to 
indicate that the destruction "proper" of their rights amount to an 
expropriation. In view of the two-stage approach followed in the 
constitutional context, this means that the aggrieved parties will have 
:to indicate not only that their claims to minerals under the "old order" 
constitute rights protectable in terms of section 25, "but" also that the 
transitional provisions of the MPRD Act, along with the exercise of the 
ministerial discretion,112 amount to an imposition which must be" tested 
against section 25(1) and section 25(2). For purposes of proving the 
existence of a protectable right as well as an. infringement upon this right, 
the existing requirements under the Expropriation Actll3 may serve to 
give more specific content to the constitutional expropriation require-
ments in as far as this. Act is compatible with the Constitution. 
As soon as the aggrieved parties have indicated that acknowledged. and 
protectable rights in terms of the Constitution have been infringed, it will 
be up to the state to indicate that such infringements ate justifiable under 
the Constitution. In this context, it must be the exercise of ministerial 
consent in terms of the transitional measures read with section 5,114 
" W'hjch requires scrutiny. The requirements of "generally applicable law" 
effecting the deprivation, as well as the requi1:ement of "non-arbitrari-
" , 
ness" and "proportionality" may be problematic h~re. As we have 
indicated above1lS it may be doubted whether the "broad discretion 
afforded to the minister under the MPRD Act provid¢B affected parties 
witp. sllfficient certainty as to the consequences of this Act. Furthermore, 
as" has been indicated elsewhere, 1l~ it may be doubted whether the 
appr-oach of the legislature here results in a proper: balance between 
means and ends of legislative reform. The result is misgivings as to the 
rational connection between the grave impositions brought about by the 
transitional provisions (especially in the context of· destructions 
"proper"), and the broader goals of economic emp()'~verment, economic 
growth and s~tainable development. 
I? There are two separate instances in the MPRD Act of provisions introducing ministerial discretion: 
'" . ite.in 8 read with s 17 or 23 respectively afford holders of unused old order rights the exclusive right to . 
~'l ~pp1y for "prospecting or mining rights respecti.v.e1y. Conversion of old order wospecti.ng rights and 
. 91d oJ"der mining rights take place under the ministerial discretion envisaged by item 6(3) in the case 
(I. ;or prospecting rights, and item 7(3) in the case of mining .rights. 
113 63 of 1975. 
114 See n 112 above. 
us See. par 2 1 2 l(a) above. 
116 Badenhorst 2003 Obiter 46-64. 
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3 1 2 Non..c;ompliance with the application requirements (the case of 
the '~~/az.y'· holder) 
The destruction of rightS as a result of non~compliance with the 
application for 'qonve~si(;)Ii" requirement also 'raises the question of 
whether "lazy" right holders are entitled to claim any compensation 
for expropriation where no application was made under the new Act. In 
con,sidering the latte~. issue, .it must be kept in mind that a landowner 
traditionally is not obliged to perform any acts with or upon hisfher land. 
Likewise~ mineral right holders traditionally were not obliged to exercise 
these rights. The requirement that existing "old order" right holders now 
are forced to reapply for conversion of their rights may,' in the context of 
unexerciSed "old order" n8hts, result in an additional burden placed 
upon su~h right holders. If such holders do not re~apply' in terms of the 
MPRD Act, their rights will ~expire after the respective. pepodS of grace 
envisaged for different typeS of "old order" rights in the transitional 
provisions.117 In such cases; the transitional provisions ·also result in 
destruction "proper" of existing rights, and. the' same considerations 
should .be applicable in the ciontext of constitutional property protection 
and remtlation, as those discussed in paragraph 3 1 1 above. 
The only dis$-cti~~ to oUr niinds, between the situation sketched· in 
3 1 1 abov~ ~d the situatiOli where holders of "old order" rights choose 
not to comply with the re-application requirements, may be found in the 
application· ·of. item 12(1) .t~ the respective case ·scenap.~s. Where an 
application for conversion was unsuccessful, the unfortunate applicant 
will have to be informed of the minister's decision and- $e reasons for it. 
Hence it would. he relatively easy to indicate the occurrence of an 
expropriation in the context- of the administrative exer~se of the state's 
powers .. If no appliCation for conversion was made; the ~ster i~ under 
no obligation to inform the ~old order" right holder of the cessation of 
his/her rights after expiry ~f tl;te. periods of grace. In .fact,. it may be 
argued that the cessation 'Of J;ights . occurred through no action of the 
adniinisttative authorities r~ponsible, but irideed as a result of the inertia 
of the right holders themselves. Hence, even' though the rights will be 
extinguished, it may be mort( diflicult to link such destruction with the 
actions of the relevant state authorities. . 
Upon a means~nds analysis it may perhaps be argued that the 
requirement of re-applicatiQn ,may be reasonably expected from the 
affected parties in this instanCe. The more vexing issue in this particular 
set-up, however, is whether the annihilation of the rights subsequent to 
the expiry of the period of grace; where· no app~cation for conversion has 
been brought, constitutes o·n1y a justifiable deprivation, or rather an 
expropriation. Seeing that the effect of the provisions here is the ult:i.rilate 
cessation of existing rights, ·one would tend to construe the action in such 
117 See part one, par 3. 
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instance rather as an expropriation. However, the affected parties need 
not receive any notice of such expropriation, and the rights terminate 
automatically after expiry of the various periods of grace. Accordingly, 
nothing in the situation itself indicates an expropriatory intention. This 
leads to the question of whether constructive expropriation·may be at 
stake. In tum, it will then have to be determined whether application of 
either a "doctrine" or simply. an argument of constructive expropriation 
doctrine here will result only in the striking of an excessive regulation of 
property, or whether the affected' parties will· be able to claim 
compensation~ 
At this point, as we have indicated above,118 it is not easy to provide a 
quick answer to thesE:f questions, since the matter of ~e application of a 
doctrine of constructive expropriation has not been finalised by the South 
African judiciary.· Following the implicit reasoning of the Constitutional 
Court in FNB v SARS, that constructive expropriation would be relevant 
as an argument warranting a finding .of constitutionality, rather than 
payment of compensation, the following result may be anticipated: since 
the possibility of a notice of expropriation is excluded where old order 
rights have expired after the grace period and there had been no 
application for conversion, the result of the transitiOl;lal provisions in this 
instance is a deprivation that "goes too far". It divests the "old order 
right" holder of the right itself, as well as the protection afforded to such 
a holder in the event of subsequent administrative action. For-all 
p~actica1 purposes, there is no' need to engage in an expropriatory 
process, since the rights simply vanish after the grace period. The 
argument that the "old order right" holder is reasonably expected, by way 
of legislative regulation, to undertake steps to ensure th~ continued 
existence of the right, or of simj]ar rights, may nevertheless counter the 
idea of constructive expropriation. 
3 1 3 Loss of pr~specting moneys and royalties 
A third i$osue concerns the loss of prospecting moneys and royalties 
upon termination of mineral rights as "old order rights". The provisions 
in the MPRD Act conceriring royalties· payable by mineral lease right 
holders to landowners/mineral right holders remain really vague. Since. 
the basis Qfthe obligation to pay royalties (the mineral lease) is destroyed 
by the MPRD Act in··generalI19 the obligation itself must naturally also 
Cease to operate, save where exceptions have been made explicitly. In this" 
118 See par 2 1 2 2 above. 
1J!) The duty of the prOSJX:Ctor or miner to pay prospecting moneys or royalties is terminated upon 
termination of the "old order" right, that is upon conversion into new order rights, or termination of 
·the period of grace, or subsequent to an unsuccessful application. See item 11, read with items 7(7) 
.apd (8): Item 11 Contains an exception to the general rule, in that communities already receiving 
consideration or royalties may continue to receive such (subsection (1» and individuals receivmS 
consideIation or royalties w.ill not lose their rights to receive these if the loss will result in undue 
hardship. or jf these are used for social upliftment. 
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context, therefore, it seems as if an expropriation of a property right is at 
stake. 
In order to qualify for payment of compensation in terms of item 12 of 
the -:transitional provisions, h9wever~ the landowner who has lost the 
rights to payment of royalties or other consideration will have to prove 
that an expropriation has taken place.12O The MPRD Act itself does not 
stipulate the arguments to be advanced in order to prove the oCCUlTence 
of expropriation. It remains i;n.clear, therefore, whether an aggrieved 
mineral right holder will have tQ' rely on the constitutional provisions of 
. sections 25(1) and 25(2) only, or whether additional elements of 
expropriation, inherited from pre-constitutional expropriation. law and 
practice (such as appropriati()~ by a state organ and permanence 'of 
expropriation), will also have ,to be fed into. the equation .. m terms of 
section 3(1) read with section 3(2)(b) ofthe"MPRD Act121 and according 
to. the envisaged provisions,.,in independent royalty legislation,122 
royalties, fees and consideratioh payable in the context of minerals will 
in future be payable ~y the miner to the state. Hence it would be relatively 
easy to indicate that appropriation of the right at the cost of the mineral 
right holder· ~ been effected. The most problematic aspect· in this 
context, therefore, is that the aggrieved party will have to prove that the 
relevant rights qualified as "property" for purposes of constitutional· 
protection, and (of course) tltat an expropriation (that is a complete 
taking of existiilg rights) has oCcurred. 
Based upon the categorisation of rights according to the likelihood of 
their being protected under ~ the constitutional property clause as 
discussed above,l23 it is submitted that the right to receive r~yalties will 
be protected under the Constit11tion. In essence such rights are personal 
in nature, referring to the abilitY to claim payment from the miner as per 
agreement. The 'withdrawal of these rights from the private ~phere, and 
the assignment thereof to the .state surely represents a deprivation of 
property in the constitutional sense. Since expropriation is probably not 
intended here, the matter of constructive expropriation must· arise if this 
deprivation is to be s~ck do~ fC:lr going too far. 
3 2 Conversion of rights 
Impositions on· property rights may be less obvious,.in the event of 
conversi.on of "old order" righ~ into new order rights. Nevertheless, we 
have shown already that at least to some extent and in most instances of . 
conversion attenuatio;n takes " place, due to the increased role of 
ministerial consent in the acquisition and. retention of new order rights, 
120' Item 13(1} of Schedule n. to the MPRD Act. 
.121" S 3(1) of the MPRD Act nmddrs the state truitodian of all the mineral resqurces in South Africa, 
whilst s 3(2)(b) empowers the state to levY ro~ties or fees ~ connection with the mining of sUch 
~ . . 
1m ' I See the cunent pr()Visions of the Draft Mineral and Petrolewn Royalty Bill. 
123 See par 2 1 1 above.' . 
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and due also to the limited duration of most of the new order rights. 
Nothing in the transitional provisions obliges the minister to convert 
. . 
existing rights into rights having exactly the same content. On the 
contrary, item 7(4) provides: "No terms and conditions applicable to the 
old order mining right remain in force if they are contrary· to any 
provision of the Constitution or this Act." 
In broad terms, the results of conversion in terms of the transitional 
provisio~, read with section 3 of the MPRD Act, may be sum·marised as 
follows in the light of the doctrine of private law rights: Upon 
introduction of the MPRD Act, the (unsevered) mineral resources of 
the country are vested in the people of South Mrica (or the state).124 
Landowners can, accordingly, no longer' deal with such unsevered 
mineral rights as they please, but have to acknowledge the custodianship 
of the state in this regard. Where 1andownership was held subject to 
mineral rights (that is where severance had already occurred), it will in 
future be subject to new prospecting and mining rights, because the right 
to prospect and mine minerals implicitly vests in the -state. l25 Holders of 
mineral rights, prospecting rights or mining rights ru:e deprived of the 
entitlements of prospecting and mining as a result of section 3(2)(a) of the 
MPRD Act. The state's right to prospect and mine. is subject to the 
transitional· measures, which grant certain statutory (perSonal) rights: 
Holders of uold order" rights may (i) apply for the granting of (or 
conyersion to) new order rights;126 or/and (li) claim compensation upon 
"expropriation of property". Upon granting (and registration) of new 
rights, similar rights are obtained with a possible restriction of some 
entitlements. The new right may have the entitlement to prosp~t or mine 
as its content. Upon possible subsequent termination of a "converted" 
right by the minister due to non-compliance with the Act, the 'holder is 
deprived of the new right.. A personal right to claim compensation exists. 
The .question in this ·context is whether the impositions as listed above 
amount to Gustifiable) deprivations in terms of section 25(1) of the 1996 
Constitution. 
The instances of impositions on existing property rights in this 
category are too numerous to justify detailed explanation of each. Hence 
we will resort to a discussion of the scenarios which concluded part" one of 
our contribution. For one, the successful conversion of "unused old 
order" mineral rights to "new order" prospecting/mining' rights results in 
the award of a more restricted right, due to the requirement of miniSterial 
consent as concerns entitlements such as· alienation and encumbrance. 
Such a right will, moreover, no longer be perpetual in nature, but will 
~epend on Compliance with of the MPRD Act for continued existence. 
1:+4. S 3(1) of the MPRl> Act. 
.~ S ·3(2Xa) of the MPRD Act. 
J26 The holder of an "unused old· order" right may apply for new prospecting/mining rights; holders of 
"old order" prG>SpeCting rights or "'old order" mining rights may apply for conversion of their 
respective rights. 
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Secqndly, in the caSe of successful conversion of rights in te~ of a 
mineral lease or prospecting Contract, . similar rights (mining rights or 
prospecting rights) are awarded. Again, the converted. rights .are more 
restricted in. content, espedially as concerns entitlements such as 
alienation and ,eD:cumbrance, ibecause of the requirement of ministerial 
consent. Furthermore, the dUration of the new prospecting and mining 
rights are now statutorily r~gulated.127 The, ,fmancial benefits to be 
derived from former minera;1. rights are also affected (by the Act's 
exclusion of the mineral rights holder from eligibility· to continue 
receiving prospecting moneysifrom the prospector or royaltiesl28 from 
the miner).1~9 In conversions of this kind~ the holder of the underl~g 
mineral right loses not oilly the mineral right but also the right to claim 
payment of further royalties. ;.' 
The situation above should ~ distinguished fro~ that addressed in our 
third example that refers to the conversion of rights in terms of statutory 
mining leases,' where royalties are in any event not an issue. Such 
conversions resul~ in the acquis~tion of mOJ,'e or less ·equal rights, save that 
duration of such right may be';under stricter control, and requirements 
for compliance with some of the statutory duties may be stricter. 
Our fourth example of successful conversion involveS the switch from 
~'old order" rnini~lg authorisations into new .order mining rights. In this· 
instance, a licence is repla~ 'with limited real rights. Underlying 
common law or statUtory rights are not- mentioned in this category. 
Assuming·.that th~ fasces appro~ch applies in this instance, it wopld result 
in other rights accompanying the pre-conversion licence (for instance 
mineral rights) terminating along with the mining authorisation, whilst 
the new ·mining· rights need to be registered in the mining titles. office. In 
such instances, the post-conver~on rights seem to be stronger than their 
pre-conversion counterparts. 
-As is apparent from particularly the frrst three examples, the rights of 
particular holders of '·'old orOOf" rights may be directly and individually 
affected where ancillary righ(s granted on successful applications for 
conversions of mining or prospecting rights, are more restricted in 
content than the origiJ;l.al "old order" rights from which, they were 
derived. This would represent an obvious instance of an imposition on 
property rights to the extent tluit the conversion to "new order" rights 
results in a renewed limi~tion' of existing rights. It must hence be 
jdetermined whether these circu.nistances give rise to a claim for payment 
of compensation in: terms of item 12 of Schedule II. 
The, reSult here depends to a:.>very large extent. on the facts of each 
ijndividual case. If the nght to lnine or ·prospect essentially is retained 
i . 
J27 As we have indicated (part one, par 4), c)epending on the content of pre-conversion mining. and 
prospecting rights. the terms of sw:h "old order" .rights could be strongVI' tban the post-convemon 
, rights under the new act. .. 
Ps S 3(2)(b) determines that t,he state will become entitled· toroya1ti~. 
'29 Save. or course. in case of either of the exc:eptions provided for in the act (see n 119 above) •. 
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. after conversion the loss of parts of other or secondary entitlements 
might be minimal; and the imposition would then not raise eyebrows 
upon rationality review or· a proportionality inquiry. However, if the 
converted right is later terminated by non-compliance with the Act, the 
holder loses all the· former entitlements, and effectively the newly 
converted right ·as well. In such circumstances it would indeed be more 
difficult to prove that the means employed by legislature and the relevant 
administrative bodies. to achieve. the goals of the Act arid. to ensure 
compliance with the Act's provisions justifies the complete loss. of 
property. 
3 3 Destructions, conversions and constructive expropriation 
The direct consequence of "old order" rights' destructions (in the 
broad sense incorporating both destructiens "prope.r~' and conversions. of 
old order rights) Under the transitional provisions is. that the way is 
cleared for the minister to grant ~ew statutory rights either to th~ original 
right holder, or to a new holder. Only when that right is gninted by the 
minister in terinS of the transitional measures, do the rights mentioned in 
section 5 of the Act ·come into existence. The landowner's ·nghts to the 
ririnerals in the land are obviously expropriated by the minister in favour 
of the prospector, miner or permit holder130 if the minister exercise~ his! 
her powers in terms of the transitional measures. The holders pf 
prospecting rights 9r mining rights are enabled by section 5(3)(b) to 
prospect or mine fQr their own accounts and to dispose of the fruits of 
their mining activities. Accordingly, the rights to ·the minerals pass from 
the landowner to the new holder through the exe:rcise of the ministerial 
discretion.H1 
If appropriation· by the state or another party. is regarded as a 
prerequisite for expropriation, then the transitional', provisions cannot 
amount to expropriation unless an inimediate vesting of a similar right in 
a new party or the state occurs. Furthermore,. th~ .actiop. with. the 
expropriatory effect is invariably one taken "by ari executive organ (the 
minister, in terms. of the transitional measures) rather than an outright. 
statutory action. If the action then does not amount to an expropriation, 
it 'may still qualify as a mere deprivation of property, which still has to 
pass constitutional scrutiny. The question that remains then is whether 
the effect of the deprivation is excessive. 
In each isolated instance where the· minister exercises hisfher power to 
grant a statutory mining right or prospecting right, the exercise of this 
power may result in an expropriation or regu1~tion .of the eXisting "old 
order" right. If the view is taken that expropriation requires an 
130 We have already pointed out ·that the permit holder is not expressly granted the right to mine and 
dispose of minerals, but for purposes hereof we assume that to be the case. . 
131 The landowner nevertheless re:au:Uns entitled to the use and control of the surface of the land, subject 
to the regulatory measures incorporated in s SO of the Act. 
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appropriation of similar rights either by the state or by another party, the 
cessation of the "old order" J;ight along with the exercise of the minister's 
discretion--in favour of a party other than the "old order" right holder 
may be seen as a single act '~ounting to expropriation of such an "old 
order" right. Before approp,riation takes place, on this view, the cessation 
a I,,;" 
of the c'old order" right may at best be regarded as an excessive 
regulation _of the property rights of the "old order" right, for which 
compensation may be payable if a -wide doctrine of constructive 
expropriation is applied. ' 
If appropriation is not regarded as a requirement for expropriation, the 
cessation of the "old ordern right may be regarded as expropriation even 
before the minister exercises hisfher discretion and rewards a similar or 
new right to a party other than the "old order" right holder. 
Furthermore, one must consider the effects of the conversion of" old 
orderu rights in the hands of the existing holder thereof. The conversion 
of old order rights 'or the- gr8:dting of prospecting rights or mining rights 
. -
in terms of the transitional arrangements could be seen as partial 
compensation in cases where, the nature and content of the new order 
right amounts to a dirninuti<?n of existing rights. In such events, which 
obviously do not amount to eXpropriations, no compensation needs to 1?e 
paid ac<?Ording to the provisions of the constitutional property clause. 
Deprivations of property sQ.<;h· as these nevertheless still need to be 
effected in terms of a law of general application, which is not arbitrary, 
and which complies with the proportionality test. The payment of 
(partial) compensation cannot replace the requirements set by the 
Constitution for -deprivations~ If the legislature's arrangement in this 
regard is regarded as factLi8l compliance with the idea of constructive 
expropriation, it still does not pass muster, since no indication is_ provided 
as to whether the provisions for determining compensation in section 
25(3) of the Constitution have been :alet. 
4 Conclusionary remarks 
If one accepts that the constitutionaJ -ptoperty clause protects not only 
individual property- holdings (on a -case by case basis), but also the idea or 
regime of private property,-132 it is submitted that Schedule II must 
amount to an excessive- re~tion of existitig property rights. In this 
context, therefore, the question of constructive expropriation arises once 
a.gain. Here, however, the purpose -of relying ali a "d-octrine" or an 
argument of constructive expropriation would not be to secure 
_ compensation in an individual case, but rather -to achieve the striking 
of the relevant provisions on the basis of their excessiveness. 
In any event, convincing reasonS would have to be advanced on the 
baSis of section 25(1). or section 36 or both, if a steep imposition on 
132 See our view as set out in BadeDhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Property 8-9. 
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property (such as the destruction of the legal concept of property through 
the transitional provisions) is to qualify as a justifiable deprivation. of 
property. It must be doubted. whether, on the basis of rationality andt 
justifiability, as components of the South African proportionality test, 
and indeed eventually on the basis of strict proportionality (in the sense 
of balancing of competing interests as a final stage of the proportioilaIity 
inquiry), such reasons exist. If this is indeed the case, and the transitional 
provisions of the MPRD Act are unconstitutionW. as a whole, the 
constitutionality of the Act in· its entirety is in issue, since most of the new 
order arrangements depend on the effectiveness with ,which the transition 
from the old order to the new order can be achieved.. Hence, although we 
have argued that section 3(1) does not bring· about a full-scale 
nationaIisation of mineral resources in South Africa, the effect of the 
transitional provisions as a whole, along with section 3(2)(a), -is to destroy 
the legal institutions of mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining 
rights as they are known in South Mrica. 
OPSOMMING 
Wysigings aan ~e onlangs .wtgevaardigde Wet op OntwikkeIing van ;Minerale en Petroleum 
Hulpbronne noodsaak 'n herbesk.ouing van die oorganisbep~ van die wet. Hierdie bydrae 
het ten doel om die aard en iDhoud van die .regte wat deur die {)organgsbepaJings geraak. word te 
analiseer, en die effek van. die oorga.ngsbepaIings op sodanige regte teen die grondwetIike 
eiendomsklousule, te toets. Die analise is gestruktureer in twee aparte afdelings. Dee! een ~ 'n 
vergelyking van "ou orde" regte en die nuwe regte in terme van die Wet behels. Meegaande deeI 
twee fokus op grondwetlikb.eidskwessies. Dit verskaf On oorsig oor die relevante bepalings van die 
grondwetlike eiendomsklousuIe. Die strekwydte van die klousule, samehang tussen die 
eiendomsklousule en die algem.ene beperkingsklousu1e. sowel as die verski1lende kategoriee 
inbreuke op eiendom in terme van die Grondwet, word bespreek. Hierna word die algeme:ne 
beginse1s rakende grondwet1ike eiendomsbeskerming en -regulering toegepas op die verski11ende ' 
probleemsi.tUasies wat reeds in deel een van hierdie bydrae geiden.tifiseer is. 
